OSP faults Charles Adu Boahen for influence peddling
The Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) has issued an investigation report faulting Charles Adu Boahen, a former Minister of State at the Ministry of Finance, for engaging in influence peddling or trading in influence.
In the OSP's investigative findings issued today [Oct 30, 2023], the Special Prosecutor, Kissi Agyebeng said his office had more than sufficient basis to so conclude, after forensic investigation and analysis of the investigative documentary titled 'Galamsey Economy,' produced by Tiger Eye P.I., a private investigation agency headed by investigative journalist, Anas Aremeyaw Anas.
The OSP said Influence peddling or trading in influence is a significant index of corruption worldwide, and it is deprecated under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).
"Though Ghana is a state party to the UNCAC, the nation has yet to specifically prohibit influence peddling or trading in influence as a criminal offence. Consequently, the OSP lacks the legal mandate to pursue prosecution in this matter," it added.
"The OSP joins calls by civil society groups, particularly OccupyGhana, on the passage of a Corrupt Practices Act and a Conduct of Public Officers Act. These legislative measures are essential for the establishment of a stronger legal framework and more effective mechanisms to combat and penalise corruption and corruption-related offences," it said.
The OSP therefore concluded that the suspected corruption and corruption-related offences involving Charles Adu Boahen, do not fall directly under the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP).
The OSP said those alleged crimes can be handled by the Attorney-General.
In the OSP's conclusion, the A-G is the one best placed to handle it and not OSP because of jurisdictional issues.
On November 14, 2022, President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo requested the OSP to investigate the said allegations against Mr. Adu Boahen contained in an investigative documentary titled ‘Galamsey Economy’ produced by investigative journalist, Anas Aremeyaw Anas.
Further action on Charles Adu Boahen
The Special Prosecutor in his report stated that though the conduct of Charles Adu Boahen amounts to trading in influence or influence peddling, which is closely associated with corruption, there is no actual criminal prohibition of his acts in respect of which the OSP has a mandate to further act.
Again on that reckoning, the Special Prosecutor directs the closure, at this time, of the investigation in respect of allegations of corruption and corruption-related offences involving Charles Adu Boahen contained in the investigative documentary titled Galamsey Economy published by Tiger Eye P.I. The investigation may be re-opened should the circumstances and further facts so dictate.
It added that the non-prohibition of most predicate acts of corruption and corruption-related offences engenders impunity of malevolent conduct and the erosion of democratic tenets, which spawn formidable hurdles in the fight against corruption, especially in the public sector.
Pass Corrupt Practices Act
On this score, the OSP calls for the passage of a Corrupt Practices Act to comprehensively codify the prohibition of all forms of corruption. Further, the OSP joins up with the positively persistent.
The Attorney-General has the police, the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), the Economic and Organised Crimes Office (EOCO), the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and others.
The offence of influence peddling has not been codified in Ghanaian criminal statute hence the OSP's call for passage of Corrupt Practices Act and Conduct of Public Officers Act to deal with the offence of influence peddling.
Report of Investigation into Alleged Commission of Corruption and Corruption-Related Offences involving Charles Adu Boahen, 30 October 2023
OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION
1.1 The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) presents this report on an
investigation into suspected corruption and corruption-related offences
involving Charles Adu Boahen, a former Minister of State at the Ministry of
1.2 The report has been heavily redacted to safeguard national security and to
protect the privacy of persons investigated and interviewed.
2.0 Charles Adu Boahen
2.1 Charles Adu Boahen is a Ghanaian politician and a member of the governing
New Patriotic Party. He is the son of Professor Albert Adu Boahen (deceased),
a historian and politician, who was the New Patriotic Party flagbearer in the 1992
presidential elections in Ghana. Charles Adu Boahen served as a Deputy Minister
for Finance during the first term of President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo.
Upon re-election for a second term, President Akufo-Addo appointed Mr. Adu
Boahen as a Minister of State at the Ministry of Finance.
2.2 The President relieved Mr. Adu Boahen of his position as Minister of State at
the Ministry of Finance in November 2022 on the back of allegations of the
commission by Mr. Adu Boahen of suspected corruption and corruption-related
3.1 By a referral dated 14 November 2022 President Nana Addo Dankwa AkufoAddo requested the OSP to investigate allegations of corruption and corruptionrelated offences involving Mr. Adu Boahen contained in an investigative
documentary titled Galamsey Economy published by a celebrated Ghanaian
investigative journalist, Anas Aremeyaw Anas and his associates operating under
the corporate name of Tiger Eye P.I., a private investigation outfit headquartered
3.2 By a complaint dated 13 November 2022 and received on 15 November 2022
Tiger Eye P.I. requested the OSP to investigate Mr. Adu Boahen for corruption
and corruption-related offences arising from the investigative documentary
referred to in paragraph 3.1. Tiger Eye P.I. attached an audio-visual recording
contained on a flash drive together with a transcript of the audio-visual recording
to the complaint.
3.3 The complaint alleged that, through its sting operations, Tiger Eye P.I. audiovisually recorded Mr. Adu Boahen in the act of his commission of corruption
and corruption-related offences. The complaint stated that undercover agents of
Tiger Eye P.I., posing as businessmen who were interested in investing in Ghana,
met with Mr. Adu Boahen and tabled their investment plans and proposals to
him. The complaint alleged that, sensing an opportunity to cash-in on his
position as a Deputy Minister of Finance, Mr. Adu Boahen demanded twenty
per cent (20%) of the value of the proposed initial investment or ten per cent
(10%) upfront payment of the value of the proposed initial investment and postinvestment sharing of the proceeds of the investment.
3.4 The complaint also alleged that Mr. Adu Boahen offered to introduce the
undercover agents to the President and the Vice President in aid of establishing
them as very influential persons in Ghana. It was alleged that this offer was
premised on Mr. Adu Boahen’s stated close ties to the President – akin to an
uncle and a nephew relationship, and his political connections to the Vice
3.5 The complaint further alleged that Mr. Adu Boahen demanded Two Hundred
Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to be given to the Vice
President for the purposes of facilitating a meeting to be set up by Mr. Adu
Boahen between the Vice President and the undercover agents.
4.1 The Special Prosecutor, upon determining that the referral and complaint spoke
to the same set of allegations against Mr. Adu Boahen and that they were within
the mandate of the OSP, authorised the commencement of preliminary
investigation into the matter in accordance with regulation 5(1)(b) and
subsequently, a full investigation under regulations 5(1)(c) and 6 of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor (Operations) Regulations, 2018 (L.I. 2374).
4.2 The investigation was conducted with as little intrusion into the privacy of
persons as the circumstances permitted.
4.3 The contents of the flash drive attached to the complaint filed by Tiger Eye P.I.
were forensically verified as a true reflection of the events represented thereon.
4.4 The investigation spanned a period of six (6) months. The identities of persons
are disclosed where necessary.
5.0 The Context
5.1 The allegations against Mr. Adu Boahen are situated in the context of an
undercover investigative journalistic type of sting operations. Typically, a sting
operation takes the form of the creation of a platform or opportunity for persons
believed or suspected to be disposed to or involved in the commission of a crime
to actually commit the crime, thus providing hard evidence for their successful
prosecution and punishment. In the context of undercover investigative
journalism, sting operations are usually characterised by the feigning of interest
in a matter by undercover agents and the provision by them of opportunities for
the commission of prohibited acts by the person of interest through winning the
confidence of the person of interest for the person of interest to reveal his or
her criminal activities or for the person of interest to commit a crime. The
undercover agents usually secretly audio-visually records the acts of the person
of interest as evidence of their criminal culpability.
5.2 Sting operations are controversial and divisive of opinion. This largely stems
from the fact that the undercover agent never has a real intention of committing
a crime and yet sets up the props and the platform for the commission of a crime
by the person under investigation. In particular, the undercover investigative
journalistic type evokes intense reaction from its critics. The triggers of the
consternation of the opponents of this type of evidence collection are summed
up under three heads. First, the opposers of undercover investigative journalistic
sting operations argue that unless sanctioned by the state, a private person has
no business provoking and encouraging the commission of a crime by a person
and proceeding to audio-visually record the person in the act of the commission
of the crime without that person’s consent. In the estimation of the opposers,
the audio-visual recording of a person without his consent violates that person’s
right to privacy.
5.3 The opponents of undercover investigative journalistic sting operations also
argue that it amounts to entrapment. On this score, the opposers posit that the
person caught on camera committing criminal acts had no intention of
committing a crime from the onset but went along with the seed sown by the
undercover agent and the suggestion and encouragement of the undercover
agent. And that but for the poisonous seed sown by the undercover agent and
his active suggestion and encouragement, the person caught in the act and on
tape would not have committed the crime.
5.4 Further, some opponents of undercover investigative journalistic sting
operations label it as investigative terrorism. In their estimation, this type of
evidence collection amounts to harassment of the person caught in the act on
5.5 Herein lies the problem. Or, is it? For the answer, we invite a reflection on the
actions of three persons of interest in the following illustration.
5.6 Let us name our first person of interest Kofi Mensah. Let us say that Kofi
Mensah has no criminal record. Let us assume that Kofi Mensah is not criminally
minded and he has no intention of committing a crime. Let us place Kofi Mensah
at a quiet and deserted underground parking lot of an apartment building in
Accra. Now, Kofi Mensah is happily whistling to himself as he leisurely strolls
through the parking lot to his car. He notices a vehicle with its doors ajar. He
draws closer and sees no one in the vehicle. He bends to inspect the interior of
the vehicle and he sees an iPhone lying on the driver seat. Upon further
inspection, he concludes that the owner of the vehicle must have purposely left
the doors ajar to airdry the interior and in the process forgot to take the iPhone
and left it unattended.
5.7 Kofi Mensah has several courses of action. He could simply decide to mind his
own business and walk away while pondering over the carelessness of the owner
of the iPhone. Afterall, the law does not require him to be a Good Samaritan.
He could also, community-minded, assure by whatever means that the owner
would not lose the iPhone to a criminally minded person who chances by. There
is yet a third choice. Kofi Mensah could pocket the iPhone and walk off without
the intention of returning it or having it returned to the owner. If Kofi Mensah
takes the third course of action, he commits the crime of stealing – since by so
doing he has dishonestly appropriated the iPhone without the consent of the
5.8 Let us leave Kofi Mensah in his thoughts for a moment and introduce our
second person of interest. Let us name our second person of interest Kwaku
Kumi. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi has no criminal record. Let us say that
Kwaku Kumi is not criminally minded and he has no intention of committing a
crime. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi is an undercover investigative journalist. Let
us say that unbeknownst to Kofi Mensah, Kwaku Kumi is the owner of the
iPhone and the exposed vehicle. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi is carrying out an
undercover investigative journalistic sting operation upon a tip off that burglars
regularly break into vehicles at that parking lot. To verify the claims or otherwise,
he intentionally arranged the scene of the unattended iPhone and exposed
vehicle and hid nearby to observe the actions of passersby vis-à-vis his prop.
5.9 Kwaku Kumi approaches the scene and he immediately senses Kofi Mensah’s
moral conflict and dilemma. Kwaku Kumi suggests to a startled Kofi Mensah
that they should sell the iPhone and split the proceeds. Kofi Mensah initially
recoils from Kwaku Kumi’s suggestion. However, upon further prompting he
agrees with Kwaku Kumi and he walks out of the parking lot with the iPhone
upon proposing that Kwaku Kumi should meet up with him at an agreed
rendezvous for the sharing of the proceeds. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi audiovisually recorded the entire encounter from the moment Kofi Mensah walked
up to the opened-up vehicle till when he walked out of the parking lot with the
iPhone. Let us say that upon a tipoff by Kwaku Kumi, Kofi Mensah is
apprehended by the police as he attempts to sell the iPhone. Let us say that the
relatives of Kofi Mensah are incensed that but for Kwaku Kumi’s suggestion
and further prompting, Kofi Mensah would never have stolen the iPhone. And
they further claim that Kwaku Kumi entrapped Kofi Mensah and actively
harrased him to commit the crime and that Kwaku Kumi is not an investigative
journalist after all but an investigative terrorist. They are particularly incensed
that Kwaku Kumi audio-visually recorded the entire crime.
5.10 Let us now introduce our third person of interest, Kwame Samson. Let us say
that Kwame Samson has no criminal record. Let us assume that Kwame Samson
is not criminally minded and he has no intention of committing a crime. Let us
place Kwame Samson at the same parking lot and by the same exposed vehicle
and iPhone. Upon seeing the iPhone on the driver seat, Kwame Samson quickly
grabs the iPhone and runs out of the parking lot before Kwaku Kumi, who was
hiding nearby, could approach him. Let us say that Kwame Samson is
apprehended by the police as he attempts to sell the iPhone. Let us say that the
relatives of Kwame Samson are utterly shocked by his actions. They had always
known him as a quiet and gentle young man.
5.11 If we are to collectively engage in objective detached reflection devoid of
personal biases and interests, it would seem obvious to every reasonable person
that Kofi Mensah is no special and certainly no different from Kwame Samson.
They are both thieves – they stole the iPhone. They did not commit a crime of
necessity driven by a justifiable or excusable desire to overcome a greater harm.
The factors that motivated them to steal the iPhone may be different. However,
they are both criminals of opportunity. True it is that they set off initially without
previous deliberation or prior or advanced plans to steal the iPhone. Yet, upon
being presented with the opportunity to steal the iPhone, they calculated that the
benefit to them of stealing the iPhone would outweigh the risk of being harmed
or apprehended in the process. Thus, they took advantage of the situation and
stole the iPhone. They had several options. They did not have to steal, as no one
compelled them to steal. They acted on their own free will. It makes no
difference that in the case of Kofi Mensah he acted after the suggestion and
further prompting by Kwaku Kumi. In the end, he willingly stole the iPhone. He
was not under any form of force or duress exerted by Kwaku Kumi. The
suggestion and further prompting to steal was not coercion. It was merely a test
of moral resolve. It does seem to lie very ill in the mouths of the relatives of Kofi
Mensah to assert that he would not have stolen the iPhone but for the suggestion
and further prompting by Kwaku Kumi. Afterall, no one knows what is on a
person’s mind. The devil himself does not know what it is on man’s mind – it is
5.12 Then again, it does seem to lie very foul in the mouths of the relatives of Kofi
Mensah to claim that he was entrapped by Kwaku Kumi to steal the iPhone.
Entrapment entails tricking an unwary person to commit a crime. The person so
tricked is, by his lack of caution or prudence, unaware that he is engaged in a
criminal enterprise, and he is led in that unwitting state to commit a crime. It
does seem clear that Kwaku Kumi did not trick Kofi Mensah to steal the iPhone.
He presented Kofi Mensah with the opportunity and suggested the benefit of
the crime to him and offered him a cut of the proceeds. Kofi Mensah was not
unaware that he was engaged in a criminal venture. Indeed, he knew at all times
from the moment Kwaku Kumi approached him that he was being invited to a
5.13 In this illustration, Kofi Mensah’s actions show that he would seize the
opportunity to commit a crime if presented with one – especially where, as in
this case, the benefits far outweigh the risks. And it beggars belief that the
opponents of undercover investigative journalistic sting operations blame not
the perpetrator of the crime but rather placate them as victims of undercover
agents. And upon that perplexing altar of appeasing the evildoer, they proceed
to chastise undercover agents as though they were the scourge of the earth.
5.14 Persons like Kofi Mensah are not victims of circumstances caught in a web they
are unable to extricate themselves from. They are not luckless victims who
unknowingly walk into a criminal den. If they are victims, then they are victims
of their own begetting and their inability to willingly walk away from crime. The
responsibility for the crimes they commit should be laid fully on them and not
on any suggester or encourager or provider of opportunity.
5.15 On another score, it does seem to do much violence to language for the relatives
of Kofi Mensah to claim that Kwaku Kumi terrorised and harassed him to steal
the iPhone. Kwaku Kumi did not coerce or by any means compel Kofi Mensah
to steal the iPhone. It was not akin to the gunman situation writ large – steal the
iPhone or I shoot you. Kwaku Kumi’s suggestion merely emboldened Kofi Mensah
and steeled his resolve. If we will not commend persons like Kwaku Kumi,
certainly we should not condemn them. They are underserving of our reproach.
The persons deserving of condemnation and the stamp of opprobrium are
persons like Kofi Mensah. On every level, it does seem clear that the only reason
why the relatives of Kofi Mensah would complained is that the morally
conflicted Kofi Mensah got caught stealing an iPhone – and on camera too.
5.16 The issue of invasion of privacy may forever feature in the discourse – since the
perpetrator of the crime is audio-visually recorded without his consent in sting
operations. However, the Supreme Court has decided that better it is to trump a
person’s right to privacy to unearth or expose the commission of a crime,
especially where it is near impossible to detect the crime except by covert audiovisual recording.
5.17 In any case, it seems abundantly clear that the insistence of the opponents of
undercover investigative journalistic sting operations that the right to privacy of
a criminal is invaded in a sting operation is akin to requiring undercover agents
to disclose to persons being investigated that they are being investigated and to
enquire from them whether they would consent to be audio-visually recorded in
the process of the commission of the crime. Only an overenthusiastic legal
system would insist on such bizarre requirements. In any case, which criminal
worth his odious calling would agree or consent to be audio-visually recorded by
undercover agents in the act of the criminal’s commission of a crime.
5.18 We have deliberately taken pages to illustrate, in some detail, the arguments of
the opponents of sting operations and the tenability or otherwise of such
arguments. At the OSP, we do not find the arguments against undercover
investigative journalistic sting operations attractive. In our gathered experience
in investigating, prosecuting, and preventing corruption and corruption-related
crime, it seems to us that the views of the opposers of undercover investigative
journalistic sting operations go around in circles without any real utility except
to provide inexcusable grounds for the benefit of persons who have a propensity
to commit crimes when offered the opportunity. And the summation of the
arguments of the opponents of sting operations is merely that the criminal got
caught on camera in the act of committing a crime.
5.19 The OSP welcomes and encourages sting operations, including the undercover
investigative journalistic type. This is so especially because corruption and
corruption-related activities are extremely difficult to detect and prove. The
traditional methods of pen and paper investigations are attended by debilitating
limitations in the fight against corruption and in gaining access to the operations
of suspected corrupt persons as criminals become more sophisticated and
develop obscure and intricate designs to avoid detection. Indeed, regulation
1(1)(d) of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (Operations) Regulations, 2018
(L.I. 2374) mandates the OSP to act on investigative journalism reports and
sources. The OSP reckons undercover investigative journalistic sting operations
output as investigative journalism reports and sources.
5.20 Globally, the trend is significantly shifting toward the acceptance of
unconventional techniques of detecting and fighting crime, including the
embracement of sting operations. In the context of combatting corruption,
Article 50 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption encourages
state parties to permit surveillance and undercover operations, and to allow for
the admissibility in court of evidence derived therefrom within the limits of their
domestic laws. To that admonishing must we pay fidelity.
6.1 Tiger Eye P.I. is a private investigation outfit incorporated in Ghana with a keen
interest in the investigation of corruption cases of public interest. The agency
received several reports and complaints and reports from members of the public
about suspected corrupt practices at the Ministry of Finance, especially in respect
of allegations upfront bribe-taking and the demand by some officials of the
Ministry for unlawful payments of money from persons who had business with
the Ministry. Tiger Eye P.I. commenced investigation in 2017 in respect of
Charles Adu Boahen, who was then a Deputy Minister of Finance. The
investigation was aimed at ascertaining whether Mr. Adu Boahen was engaged
in the stated corruption and corruption-related activities.
6.2 Operatives of Tiger Eye P.I. conducted an undercover investigation over the
course of twelve (12) months by disguising themselves as sheikhs, interpreters
of the Arabic language for sheikhs and as officials of the Al Baraka Banking
Group, a public investment business firm headquartered in Manama in the
Kingdom of Bahrain. The investigation was quite elaborate and carefully planned
and executed – covering several meetings in Ghana and in the United Arab
Emirates and the purchase of round air tickets for two (2) persons (excluding
Mr. Adu Boahen) on two (2) occasions between Accra and Dubai.
6.3 Circa March 2017, the investigative journalist who was shot to death in January
2019 in Accra, Ahmed Hussein Suale, an operative of Tiger Eye P.I., approached
Solomon Amponsah, the desk officer in charge of Agricultural Development
Bank projects at the Ministry of Finance. Mr. Suale introduced himself in
disguise to Solomon Amponsah as Ahmed Divela, a representative of the Al
Baraka Banking Group. Mr. Suale tabled a proposal that the Al Baraka Banking
Group were interested in investing in Ghana, particularly in the banking sector.
Mr. Suale sounded credible as he linked the intended investment to an impending
banking and financial sector restructuring.
6.4 Convinced by Mr. Suale that the Al Baraka Banking Group genuinely intended
to invest in Ghana upon the terms stated, Solomon Amponsah broached the
intended investment to Mr. Adu Boahen. Whereupon Mr. Adu Boahen advised
Solomon Amponsah to refer the supposed Ahmed Divela to Isaac Emil OseiBonsu, a private legal practitioner operating from Accra for the purposes of due
diligence and the ascertainment of the feasibility of the intended investment.
6.5 Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu satisfied himself as to the bona fides and existence of the
Al Baraka Banking Group after several meetings in Accra and in Dubai in the
United Arab Emirates with the supposed Ahmed Divela and Solomon
Amponsah and other persons introduced as officials of the Al Baraka Banking
Group. Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu naturally became convinced of the capability of
the Al Baraka Banking Group to undertake the outlined intended investment.
The only missing piece in the puzzle was convincing Mr. Adu Boahen to meet
with the representatives of the Group, as Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu was made to
6.6 Convincing Mr. Adu Boahen was not a straightforward matter. Initially, he was
altogether unreceptive of the idea of meeting with the supposed representatives
of the Al Baraka Banking Group. Subsequently, he softened his stance and he
suggested a meeting in Accra. The undercover agents demurred. They insisted
on a meeting in Dubai. Eventually, Mr. Adu Boahen agreed to meet with the
supposed representatives of the Al Baraka Banking Group in Dubai by taking a
brief detour to Dubai on his way to Singapore on official government business.
6.7 In February 2018, Mr. Adu Boahen, Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon
Amponsah were met at the Dubai airport by the undercover agents and taken to
a hotel. Two meetings took place at the hotel. The first meeting was attended by
the undercover agents disguised and posing as officials of the Al Baraka Banking
Group, Mr. Adu Boahen, Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon Amponsah.
Upon expression of interest by the undercover agents of intended investment in
the financial sector in Ghana through the establishment of an Islamic bank, Mr.
Adu Boahen dutifully walked the supposed officials of the Al Baraka Banking
Group through the processes of setting up a bank in Ghana.
6.8 There was nothing remarkable about this meeting and had it ended there this
matter would not have come up for investigation by the OSP. However, the
undercover agents had other designs. It turned out that that meeting was
masterfully staged as a mere officious preparatory sideshow to set the tone for
the second meeting.
6.9 Then came the second meeting, immediately after the first meeting. This was an
exclusive one. Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon Amponsah were dropped
from the list of attendees. Mr. Adu Boahen was ushered alone into a different
room for further discussions with undercover agents disguised as a very wealthy
sheikh and an interpreter of the Arabic language. This meeting was held in less
formal circumstances, and it was characterised by deeper and frank discussions
that formed the entire backdrop of the purpose of the sting operation. It was
designed to enable Mr. Adu Boahen to talk freely in the absence of Isaac Emil
Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon Amponsah. It worked. This is because Mr. Adu
Boahen became less inhibited in his speech.
6.10 At the second meeting, the supposed wealthy sheikh expressed his desire of
investing about half a billion United States dollars in Africa. He indicated that
Ghana was one of the countries of interest and that he wanted to be connected
to persons of the highest political influence for the purpose of establishing his
business footprint. Mr. Adu Boahen, intending to assure the supposed sheikh of
his political office, influence and connections, launched into his family history
about his father, the relationship between the President and his father, his close
ties to the President, which is akin to an uncle and nephew relationship, and his
close affinity to the Vice President.
6.11 The supposed sheikh picked up on Mr. Adu Boahen’s assurances of the comfort
of his high political influence and connections, and he laid the cards of the whole
purpose of the sting operation on the table by enquiring as to the percentage cut
Mr. Adu Boahen would take in respect of the intended investment in the
financial sector in Ghana. After a bit of hesitation, Mr. Adu Boahen, on his own
volition, suggested twenty percent (20%) of the intended investment as his cut.
Mr. Adu Boahen must have meant this percentage cut demand as a shot in the
dark. This is because he could not believe his immense good fortune and he
could not hide his utter surprise as the supposed sheikh readily agreed to his
suggestion. Indeed, Mr. Adu Boahen stated that he thought the sheikh would
reject the suggested percentage cut as too pricey.
6.12 Upon further enquiry by the supposed sheikh as to any further required
commitments to secure the proposed high political influence in Ghana, Mr. Adu
Boahen suggested the prudence of the payment of an appearance fee of Two
Hundred Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to the Vice President
– with the explanation that being a Muslim, the Vice President would be very
keen to assist in the establishment of the proposed Islamic bank.
6.13 The supposed sheikh offered Mr. Adu Boahen Forty Thousand United States
dollars (US$40,000.00) in cash as shopping money. The supposed sheikh placed
the cash on a piece of furniture close to Mr. Adu Boahen, and he accepted and
collected the cash with gratitude. During the investigation, Mr. Adu Boahen
stated that he politely accepted the cash gift in order not to offend the sensibility
of a potential wealthy investor looking to invest half a billion United States
dollars in Ghana.
6.14 The undercover agents secretly audio-visually recorded the entirety of both
6.15 In the high political office he occupied, it ought reasonably to have occurred to
Mr. Adu Boahen that his bargain for twenty percent (20%) of the value of the
proposed investment and his receipt of a cash gift of Forty Thousand United
States dollars (US$40,000.00) from the supposed sheikh was outrightly
improper. Mr. Adu Boahen exhibited lack of sound judgment. His claim that he
accepted the cash gift to avoid offending the supposed sheikh lies very thinly;
and his suggestion of the payment of an appearance fee of Two Hundred
Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to the Vice President was quite
reckless – especially as the Vice President was unaware of the business he was
conducting and had not tasked him to demand money of whatever description
on his behalf. All the indices point to the conclusion that Mr. Adu Boahen’s
principal motivation was his own personal gain though he intimated to the
supposed sheikh that he was driven by the potential developmental benefits to
Ghana of the proposed investment.
6.16 The conduct of Mr. Adu Boahen amounts to trading in influence or influence
peddling. This is the practice of using one’s influence or connections in public
office or with persons in public office to obtain favours or preferential treatment
for oneself or for another person, usually in return for payment. These acts have
not been specifically prohibited in our jurisdiction as crimes per se. However, they
are gravely frowned upon and punishable as crimes in some jurisdictions. This
is because such acts are closely associated with corruption offences like using
public office for profit and they also form the building blocks of general
corruption. Then again, since they are closely associated with corruption, they
have the effect of delegitimising democratic governance.
6.17 Mr. Adu Boahen engaged in trading in influence or influence peddling by
employing his political office and close personal ties to the President and the
Vice President to obtain favours of an actual cash gift and a prospective
percentage cut of the proposed investment by the supposed sheikh. This is so
notwithstanding the fact that the proposed investment was a prop and could not
have actualised since there were in fact no actual investors. Mr. Adu Boahen
stood to make a substantial personal gain had it been an actual investment
proposal. It is no thanks to Mr. Adu Boahen that the investment proposal was
never actually intended. Thus, he cannot seek refuge in its never-to-come-tofruition attribute.
6.18 Mr. Adu Boahen certainly did not know that the whole enterprise was like a
motion picture prop. He thought it was an actual investment proposal. Indeed,
Mr. Adu Boahen admitted that he believed he was dealing with a genuine wealthy
sheikh who had the advertised wherewithal to make good on the proposed
investment. Therefore, his actions should be considered on account of his state
of mind and state of knowledge at the time of the second meeting – which was
that he thought he had bagged for himself a real prospect of a windfall of twenty
percent (20%) of a coming investment worth Five Hundred Million United
States dollars (US$500,000,000.00) in addition to receiving and pocketing Forty
Thousand United States dollars (US$40,000.00).
7.0 Further Action
7.1 Though the conduct of Mr. Adu Boahen amounts to trading in influence or
influence peddling, which is closely associated with corruption, there is no actual
criminal prohibition of his acts in respect of which the OSP has a mandate to
7.2 On that reckoning, the Special Prosecutor directs the closure, at this time, of the
investigation in respect of allegations of corruption and corruption-related
offences involving Charles Adu Boahen contained in the investigative
documentary titled Galamsey Economy published by Tiger Eye P.I. The
investigation may be re-opened should the circumstances and further facts so
7.3 The non-prohibition of most predicate acts of corruption and corruption-related
offences engenders impunity of malevolent conduct and the erosion of
democratic tenets, which spawn formidable hurdles in the fight against
corruption, especially in the public sector. On this score, the OSP calls for the
passage of a Corrupt Practices Act to comprehensively codify the prohibition of
all forms of corruption. Further, the OSP joins up with the positively persistent
calls of the pressure group, OccupyGhana for the passage of a Conduct of Public
Officers Act to properly regulate the conduct of public officers.
8.1 The OSP commends the President for the referral to the OSP for the conduct
of investigation into suspected corruption and corruption-related offences
involving Mr. Adu Boahen.
8.2 The OSP commends Tiger Eye P.I. led by Anas Aremeyaw Anas for conducting
the sting operation in respect of suspected corruption and corruption-related
offences involving Mr. Adu Boahen, and for filing a complaint with the OSP in
respect of the sting operation for the commencement of the present
8.3 The OSP commends the lawyers of the various persons who attended the OSP
for their professionalism.
The Special Prosecutor
The Republic of Ghana
30 October 2023