Do Ghanaians want accountable governance? The evidence suggests they do. Consider their responses to accountability-themed questions in the most recent Afrobarometer survey (Round 10, 2024):
• On electoral accountability, 81 per cent say we must choose our leaders through regular, open, and honest elections, while 73 per cent support a constitutional two-term limit for presidents.
Furthermore, 62 per cent agree that "in a democracy, it is better if power sometimes changes hands in elections from one political party to another."
Together, these responses reflect a firm commitment to using both elections and term limits to hold elected officials accountable.
• On oversight of the executive, 79 per cent say parliament should ensure that the president explains to it, regularly, how government spends taxpayers' money, and an identical 79 per cent insist that the president must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong.
• On responsiveness, 85 per cent say our elected officials should listen to voters' views and do what they demand.
• On the accountability–efficiency trade-off, 69 per cent say it is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means decisions are made more slowly.
• On the watchdog role of the media, 82 per cent say the news media should constantly investigate and report on government mistakes and corruption.
Partisans want accountable governance too. Consider this example from the Afrobarometer data shared above: on the watchdog role of the media, 83 per cent of National Democratic Congress (NDC) partisans and 84 per cent of New Patriotic Party (NPP) partisans agree that the news media should constantly investigate and report on government mistakes and corruption.
Indeed, when the accountability-themed questions discussed above are disaggregated by party affiliation, the pattern holds — despite small gaps on certain questions, there is broad partisan consensus on the need for accountable governance, at least in principle.
Partisan responses to accountability
Why then is the search for accountable governance regularly met with partisan resistance? I ask because almost every effort to hold public officials accountable — when it involves persons on their side of the political aisle — is dismissed as "political witch-hunting".
The prosecutors, judges and the anti-corruption agencies are all seen as instruments of the State deployed to unfairly target persons.
This usually happens when there is an electoral turnover, and a new government embarks on post-regime accountability of the previous government.
One is left wondering what criteria, if any, are used to evaluate the legitimacy of a search for accountability, beyond the simple test of whose ox is being gored.
The real danger here is twofold. First, this partisan reflex has the unintended consequence of delegitimising the very institutions and processes designed to hold public officials accountable.
What does delegitimisation look like in practice? It says certain questions must not be asked. It questions the authority of state actors and ascribes ill motive to their actions. It dismisses the decisions of the courts and accuses judges of political connivance.
It promises revenge once power alternates after a future election.
While delegitimisation may serve a short-term political purpose, it produces a second, more lasting consequence: weakened institutions in which citizens have little to no confidence. Is it any surprise, then, that 10 rounds of the Afrobarometer survey show Ghanaians expressing persistently low trust in public institutions?
Or that, when the data is disaggregated by party affiliation, trust in an institution tends to rise slightly whenever a citizen's preferred party is the one in power?
I do not hold brief for institutions that abuse their power or fail to respect the due process rights of citizens.
But I worry that three decades of multiparty democracy, met with these partisan responses to accountability, serve no good purpose for our democratic institutions — and, ultimately, for our democracy itself.
Where do we go from here?
First, ruling governments must make in-regime accountability a regular feature of their tenure in office. We should not always have to wait for a turnover election. When accountability is activated post-regime, it becomes easily vulnerable to delegitimisation.
Second, state institutions must endeavour to operate in such a way that their inactions or inactions do not lend ammunition to delegitimisation. At the same time, they must not become hesitant in seeking accountability because of partisan reactions.
State institutions must remember one important thing - their legitimacy depends on consistency in how they treat citizens regardless of which political party is in power.
Whenever an accountability institution is perceived as doing the bidding of one side of the political aisle, it hands all partisans a ready-made response for the next time scrutiny turns toward them.
Institutions cannot control how partisans respond. However, they must be guided by this – you are not just adjudicating individual cases. You are contributing to whether accountability itself can survive as a norm above partisanship.
The writer is Project Director, Democracy Project.
