The constitutional review debate should focus on whether Ghana's institutions can prevent misuse of public resources, expose wrongdoing and secure consequences when controls fail.
Ghana's renewed constitutional review offers more than an opportunity to adjust legal
language. It is a chance to repair weaknesses in the way public power and public money are
controlled. For accountants, auditors and citizens, the central question is practical: does the
constitutional system make stewardship visible, allow independent challenge and produce
credible consequences when public resources are misused?
The answer, after more than three decades under the 1992 Constitution, is mixed. Ghana has
built important institutions and enacted substantial public financial management legislation.
Yet recurring audit irregularities, weak follow-up, opaque asset declarations, political influence
over state-owned enterprises and concentrated appointment powers show that compliance on
paper does not always produce accountability in practice.
This is why the work of the Constitutional Review Committee and the Government
Position Paper deserves careful public attention. The Committee proposes several important
safeguards. Government accepts some of them, supports others only in principle, and prefers
to address a number of issues through ordinary legislation. Flexibility matters, but it cannot
become a reason to leave oversight institutions dependent on the political authorities they
must examine.
A useful way to assess every proposal is to apply an accountant's test. Who authorises the
use of public resources? Who records and reports the transactions? Who
independently verifies the information? What happens when an irregularity is
established? If appointment, tenure, budget and enforcement all point towards the same
political centre, the control environment remains vulnerable, however impressive the
institutional names may sound.
Constitutional amendment is justified where ordinary law cannot reliably protect an institution
from the power it must oversee. The Constitution should therefore entrench the essential
safeguards: independence, secure tenure, minimum reporting and disclosure duties,
parliamentary access to information, and enforceable remedies. Legislation should supply the
technical detail, including forms, thresholds, digital filing systems, administrative timelines and
sector-specific reporting standards. This division protects core principles while allowing
procedures to evolve.
The proposed reform of the Auditor-General provides the clearest example. The Committee's
recommendation that the officeholder should be a qualified professional accountant, serve a
single non-renewable term and enjoy strong removal protection would reduce dependence on
the appointing authority. Government's acceptance of these proposals is encouraging.
However, qualification and tenure alone will not secure effective independence. Ghana must
also address transparent selection, budget autonomy, access to information and the duty to
follow through on audit findings.
An audit report does not recover money by itself. Effective accountability requires a complete
chain: auditors must obtain reliable evidence, identify responsibility and causation, give
affected persons a fair hearing, issue lawful disallowance or surcharge decisions, and track
recovery and corrective action. Parliament's Public Accounts Committee must then hold timely
hearings and ensure that adopted recommendations lead to measurable action. Repeated
reporting without recovery, sanction or control improvement leaves the accountability cycle
open.
The relationship between Parliament and the Executive also demands reform. Article 78
allows Ministers to be drawn from Parliament, creating incentives that can weaken legislative
scrutiny. The Committee proposes barring Members of Parliament from ministerial
appointment. Government instead favours removing the constitutional minimum number of
Ministers who must come from Parliament and leaving the number to presidential discretion.
That would remove compulsion, but it would not create a genuine separation between
executive delivery and legislative oversight. A Parliament expected to examine government
expenditure needs members whose political incentives support rigorous scrutiny.
The same concern arises under Article 70. Offices created to challenge government should
not depend entirely on presidential discretion for their leadership. Different institutions require
different appointment methods. Political offices may properly reflect the President's mandate.
Independent oversight bodies require open competition, merit-based shortlisting, public
reasons and meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. The appointment process must match the
constitutional function of each office.
This debate places the Council of State at the centre of constitutional reform. The Committee
proposes that the Council should recruit, vet and submit binding nominations for key
independent and hybrid-independent offices, including the Electoral Commission, CHRAJ and
the Auditor-General, with parliamentary approval where required. Government supports a
stronger advisory and vetting role but rejects binding recommendations, arguing that they
would unduly restrict executive authority. A sound distinction is necessary. The Council's
general advice on policy and matters of state may remain non-binding. However, where it
performs a recruitment function for an office intended to investigate, audit or regulate the
Executive, its properly constituted nomination should bind the President, subject to any
parliamentary approval required by the Constitution. Otherwise, an open competition could
end with the Executive disregarding the merit-based outcome.
Binding advice will command confidence only if the Council itself has an independent and
representative membership. The Committee proposes a 33-member Council with limited
presidential appointments, former parliamentarians from different parties, regional
representatives, the President of the National House of Chiefs, a former National Chief
Farmer, and nominees reflecting industry and commerce, organised labour, professional
associations, academia, civil society and faith-based bodies. Government maintains that the
present arrangement already limits presidential control because each region has
representative and also presidential nominees form a minority, including nominees drawn from
specified former high offices. The real test goes beyond a numerical count. The method of
nomination, security of tenure, political-party restrictions, disclosure of interests and continuity
across presidential terms will determine whether members can exercise independent
judgement.
The Council should not operate as a substitute human-resources department. The Public
Services Commission or another competent body should administer public advertisement,
eligibility checks and structured assessment under published criteria. The Council should
supervise the integrity of the process, interview shortlisted candidates where necessary,
record reasons and submit a ranked nomination or a limited slate. Parliament should scrutinise
appointments to the most sensitive offices. The President should retain formal appointment
authority but should not reopen a completed competition or substitute an unassessed
candidate. If a nominee is rejected for a lawful and stated reason, the matter should return to
the recruitment process. This arrangement separates professional assessment from political
appointment while preserving identifiable responsibility at each stage.
Public financial management reform also needs a careful balance between constitutional
protection and statutory flexibility. Matters such as public debt, tax expenditure, the
Contingency Fund and the medium-term fiscal framework involve technical rules that may
need periodic adjustment. Government prefers to rely substantially on the Public Financial
Management Act, 2016 (Act 921). Yet legislation alone may be insufficient when the actors
subject to fiscal limits can alter those limits through an ordinary political majority.
The Constitution should establish firm duties of transparency and parliamentary authorisation.
It should require full disclosure of public debt, guarantees, tax expenditures and contingent
liabilities. It should also define the discipline governing exceptional departures from fiscal
rules. Act 921 and related legislation can then prescribe formulas, ceilings, reporting templates
and administrative procedures. The objective is to prevent hidden fiscal risks without freezing
every technical rule in constitutional text.
The Committee's proposal concerning the Controller and Accountant-General would also
change Ghana's control model. It would strengthen the office through a fixed term, prior control
over withdrawals and commitments, and direct reporting to Parliament. Government argues
that Act 921 already assigns core duties and that excessive constitutional detail could weaken
the Finance Minister's responsibility for fiscal policy. Both concerns carry weight. The solution
is to separate policy choice from transaction control. The Minister should direct lawful fiscal
policy, while the Controller and Accountant-General should have the professional authority to
reject or escalate unlawful commitments. Ghana does not need two fiscal executives, but it
does need a clear route to Parliament when a Minister seeks to override financial law.
Asset declaration reform is equally urgent. A declaration that remains sealed, unverified and
difficult to access provides little assurance. The Committee recommends annual filing,
stronger deadlines, lifestyle audits and procedures dealing with unexplained wealth.
Government prefers to strengthen the Conduct of Public Officers Bill. That statutory route can
work only if the enacted law gives the responsible institutions effective verification powers,
access to relevant information, proportionate sanctions and adequate resources.
The law should clarify how the Auditor-General, the Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative Justice, the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the courts will share
information without duplicating roles. It should cover beneficial interests and other
relationships through which assets may be concealed. Any unexplained wealth procedure
must also provide defined triggers, a fair hearing and due process. Verification should protect
integrity without abandoning constitutional fairness.
State-owned enterprises reveal another persistent weakness. Government rejects the need
to give the State Interests and Governance Authority constitutional status, arguing that its work
is operational and can remain statutory. The stronger case for entrenchment concerns the
governance principles rather than the institution's exact form. Merit-based appointments,
transparent selection, express fiduciary duties and protection from partisan interference
should endure. Operational arrangements and reporting formats can remain in legislation.
Boards must answer for performance, while Ministers should avoid micromanagement and
political patronage.
Local government reform must also be judged by where accountability will lie. Government
proposes that all District Chief Executives should be elected, but the President would
nominate five candidates, including two women. A vetting process would approve the
candidates, and three, including one woman, would proceed to the ballot. Voters would
choose the final officeholder, but presidential control over the initial pool could preserve
upward political accountability and restrict local choice. A credible elected system should
broaden community choice and accompany political devolution with audited local accounts,
predictable transfers, transparent own-source revenue and enforceable audit follow-up.
Formal rules will not succeed without attention to institutional culture. Deference to
authority may suppress professional challenge. Patronage can displace merit, while short
political horizons encourage decisions that transfer costs to future taxpayers. Accountants and
auditors have a special responsibility in this environment. They must document professional
disagreement, protect evidence, refuse unlawful instructions and use established escalation
channels. Personal courage matters, but constitutional design should ensure that
accountability does not depend on courage alone.
The accountancy profession should therefore take a public position on the review. It should
cost proposed institutions, test their fiscal consequences, help draft clear reporting and audit
clauses, and assess implementation against credible accounting and assurance standards.
The profession should also explain to citizens that constitutional architecture has direct
economic consequences. Weak controls increase waste, borrowing costs and distrust. Strong
controls improve the quality of public services and the credibility of the state.
Ghana does not need to constitutionalise every administrative procedure. It does need to
protect the principles that political actors may otherwise weaken for convenience or self
preservation. Independent audit, verifiable disclosure, a representative Council of State,
transparent appointments, parliamentary control of fiscal risk and accountable local
government belong at the centre of the reform agenda.
The Constitutional Review Committee has advanced important safeguards, while Government
has raised legitimate concerns about rigidity and administrative detail. The right compromise
is neither automatic entrenchment nor routine statutory substitution. Each proposal should be
tested against independence, information rights, enforceability and durability. Where ordinary
political power can neutralise a safeguard, the Constitution must provide the shield. Where
procedures require regular technical revision, legislation should do the work.
Constitutional review will matter only if it changes incentives and outcomes. Ghana should
emerge with institutions that can challenge unlawful decisions, disclose fiscal risks before they
become crises, and convert audit findings into recovery and reform. That is the accountability
standard the public deserves, and it is the standard the accountancy profession should insist
upon.
Valentin Kwasi Mensah, FCCA, PhD
