On October 9, 2026, Samuel Nartey George, Ghana's Minister for Communication, Digital Technology and Innovations and Member of Parliament for Ningo-Prampram, was called to the Ghana Bar.
Less than a month later, whilst addressing allegations of misconduct by military personnel in his constituency, he warned that soldiers returning to brutalise residents would face the “law of the streets”.
The Minister also publicly described a named military officer as a thief, compared his alleged conduct to armed robbery and demanded his dismissal from the Ghana Armed Forces.
Yet, later in the same address, the Minister insisted that residents should abide by the law, allow their leaders to work with the police and seek justice through military procedures.
This apparent contradiction raises a question extending beyond one minister or one incident.
What is the relationship between professional qualification, public authority and the judgement required to exercise that authority responsibly?
In a recent article, I argued that technical competence and professional credentials, however valuable, do not automatically produce the practical wisdom necessary for public leadership.
The Honourable Sam George’s controversy provides an opportunity to examine that distinction.
A legitimate grievance, a question of judgement
The controversy followed allegations that military personnel operating around Ningo-Prampram had assaulted residents and seized trucks associated with sand-winning activities.
The Minister accused a military officer of participating in an operation without lawful authority. He also alleged that soldiers had disrespected a senior police officer and threatened police personnel with weapons.
These are serious allegations. If substantiated, they would warrant appropriate investigation and accountability.
Military personnel exercise coercive powers on behalf of the state. Those powers must remain subject to law, proper authority and established procedures.
Citizens are entitled to protection against unlawful state action. Their elected representatives have a legitimate responsibility to defend their interests.
The Member of Parliament was therefore entitled to demand answers.
But the legitimacy of a grievance does not automatically justify every response to it.
There is a distinction between demanding an investigation and publicly determining guilt.
Describing an officer as a thief and demanding dismissal before an investigation has established the facts risks collapsing that distinction.
The officer's account, the authority under which the operation was conducted, and the relevant evidence must be examined through appropriate procedures.
The authority to demand justice carries a corresponding responsibility not to prejudge it.
Two messages about the law
The most revealing feature of the Honourable Minister’s recorded remarks is the coexistence of two different appeals to justice.
His warning about the “law of the streets” invokes an ambiguous form of accountability outside the ordinary language of legal procedure.
That expression should not automatically be interpreted as an instruction to commit violence. Context matters.
Indeed, the recording also contains explicit appeals to lawful conduct.
Minister George called for disciplinary action through military institutions and instructed residents not to take the law into their own hands.
These qualifications are important. They should not be omitted merely because the earlier language attracted greater attention.
Nevertheless, the tension remains.
If the intended message was that military personnel must answer to the law, why invoke the streets as the source of accountability?
If the objective was a fair investigation, why publicly characterise the accused officer as a criminal before the facts had been established?
And if residents were being urged to exercise restraint, what message might they reasonably take from the language of the official addressing them?
These are questions about institutional responsibility, not merely rhetorical consistency.
Public officials speak with authority. Their words can shape public expectations, influence perceptions of ongoing investigations and affect confidence in institutions.
An appeal to lawful procedures may be weakened when accompanied by language suggesting that punishment could arise outside them.
Three roles, different responsibilities
Mr Samuel Nartey George occupies several positions carrying distinct responsibilities.
As a constituency Member of Parliament, he represents residents who may have experienced mistreatment. His responsibilities include raising complaints, demanding accountability and seeking appropriate remedies.
As a government minister, his statements carry additional institutional significance.
He belongs to an administration responsible for the lawful coordination of state institutions. His responsibilities therefore extend beyond expressing the concerns of constituents to respecting the procedures through which allegations against public officials are investigated.
His recent admission to the Bar introduces another dimension.
Legal education and professional admission demonstrate that an individual has satisfied prescribed academic and professional requirements.
They do not confer immunity from errors of judgement. Nor should lawyers be expected to remain silent about perceived injustice.
However, the legal profession places particular emphasis on respect for legal processes, professional integrity and the administration of justice.
The issue here is not whether Mr. George breached a specific professional rule. Such a conclusion would require examination against the applicable standards.
The more fundamental question concerns the distinction between knowing the law and exercising judgement consistent with its purposes.
A lawyer may understand the presumption of innocence. A minister may understand institutional authority. An MP may understand the responsibility to defend constituents.
Yet reconciling these obligations when they compete requires something beyond technical knowledge.
It requires practical wisdom.
What is professional education for?
In my previous article, I questioned whether public leadership education sufficiently develops the capacity to recognise when institutions are losing sight of their purpose.
I examined two fundamental questions.
What is professional education ultimately intended to achieve?
And what kinds of knowledge should count when preparing people to exercise authority?
These questions apply to legal education as well as executive education.
An individual may acquire considerable knowledge of statutes, constitutional principles, professional obligations and administrative procedures without necessarily developing the capacity to apply that knowledge wisely under pressure.
Education can establish what the law permits.
It must also cultivate judgement about what responsible authority requires.
Consider the circumstances confronting a public official who receives credible allegations of abuse by state personnel.
Constituents may be angry. Institutional responses may appear slow. Political pressure may demand immediate action.
The official must decide how to respond.
Publicly condemning alleged abuses may be appropriate. Demanding an independent investigation is legitimate. Insisting that affected citizens receive protection and remedies is necessary.
But publicly determining criminal responsibility or prescribing disciplinary outcomes before the relevant processes have established the facts raises a different question.
Professional qualification establishes what a person has learned. It does not, by itself, demonstrate how that person will exercise authority when confronted by anger, uncertainty and competing obligations.
Aristotle and practical wisdom
Aristotle's concept of phronesis, commonly translated as practical wisdom, offers a useful framework.
Practical wisdom concerns the capacity to deliberate well about what should be done in particular circumstances.
It is not simply technical expertise or familiarity with rules.
It requires an appreciation of purposes, consequences, competing responsibilities and the moral character of one's actions.
In public leadership, this means recognising that a legitimate objective can be undermined by the manner in which it is pursued.
Defending constituents against alleged abuses is legitimate.
Preserving public confidence in the armed forces is also legitimate.
So is protecting the rights of an accused officer to fair treatment.
These obligations need not be mutually exclusive.
Practical wisdom requires their reconciliation rather than allowing the urgency of one to displace the others.
This is not an argument for passivity.
Restraint does not mean silence in the face of injustice. Nor does due process require public officials to withhold criticism until every investigation has concluded.
It means distinguishing what is known from what is alleged, what requires investigation from what has been established, and what an official may demand from what only a competent authority can determine.
Professional courage includes confronting wrongdoing.
It also includes the discipline to resist premature judgement.
From confrontation to institutional process
Following the controversy, Minister George met with his counterpart at Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff as well as the service commanders.
He subsequently explained that his criticism concerned the alleged conduct of particular personnel rather than the Ghana Armed Forces as an institution.
He also welcomed the military leadership's commitment to investigate the incident.
These developments matter.
They indicate that the controversy has moved towards institutional engagement and investigation.
However, they also raise a question.
Could the same institutional engagement have occurred without the earlier public confrontation?
A minister who believes military personnel have acted unlawfully possesses access to institutional channels unavailable to ordinary citizens.
Those channels do not eliminate the right to speak publicly. But they create additional responsibilities concerning how allegations are raised and communicated.
The responsibilities of the military, police, elected representatives and civilian ministries must remain distinguishable, even when they intersect.
Public pressure may legitimately demand that these institutions act.
It should not substitute for the processes through which responsibility is established.
Education, virtue and power
Ghana's public administration includes many highly qualified individuals.
Academic degrees, professional credentials and specialised training are valuable achievements.
But credentials should not be confused with the qualities required to exercise public authority responsibly.
Again, in my previous article I argued that leadership education must develop intellectual independence, practical wisdom and moral courage alongside technical competence.
The Honourable Minister’s controversy illustrates why this distinction deserves attention.
The issue is not that an elected representative expressed anger at allegations of mistreatment.
It is that responsible public authority requires the capacity to transform legitimate anger into proportionate, procedurally sound action.
This becomes particularly important when officials confront institutions entrusted with the lawful use of force.
A minister's words may carry consequences beyond their immediate audience. A lawyer's accusations may be understood differently from those of an ordinary citizen. And an MP's legitimate advocacy may acquire the apparent authority of government when the representative also holds ministerial office.
The responsibility is therefore greater, not because public officials must suppress emotion, but because they must exercise judgement about its expression.
The discipline of judgement
The allegations concerning military conduct in Ningo-Prampram deserve proper investigation.
If wrongdoing is established, those responsible should face appropriate consequences. If allegations are not substantiated, that too must be acknowledged.
The same commitment to fairness should govern those demanding accountability.
Minister George's subsequent engagement with military leadership is relevant and deserves recognition. His explanation of his intentions also merits consideration.
But neither removes the underlying question about the language used during the original confrontation.
Public leadership requires more than knowing one's rights, understanding procedures or acquiring professional qualifications.
It requires recognising when the exercise of legitimate authority may undermine the principles that give that authority its purpose.
The measure of responsible public leadership is not simply the willingness to confront alleged injustice. It is the capacity to do so without compromising the principles through which justice must be established.
That is the difference between qualification and practical wisdom.
And it is why the education of those entrusted with public power must concern not only what they know, but how they judge.
The author is a Senior Lecturer and Researcher in Business Management at St Mary's University, Twickenham, London. His research interests include institutional drift, organisational coherence, executive education and leadership ethics.
