The Minister of Health, Kwabena Mintah Akandoh, giving an assurance that Ghana is fully prepared to detect, contain and manage any Ebola case is reassuring.
It is what every responsible government must say when a deadly virus resurfaces on the continent.
But as a country that has been through Ebola scares in 2014 and the COVID-19 reality in 2020, we know that preparedness is not declared at a press briefing at the airport.
It is built, tested and sustained in laboratories, hospitals, border posts and communities.
Ghana has not recorded a case of Ebola, and we pray we never do.
However, with confirmed cases of the disease reported in other African countries and, crucially, a recently reported case in Nigeria — a country with which we share intense daily air traffic, trade and family ties — vigilance is not optional. It is imperative.
We, therefore, welcome the minister's working visit to the Accra International Airport yesterday to assess preparedness at the country's primary gateway.
Symbolism matters in public health.
When the minister shows up at the airport, meets port health personnel, airport executives and technical officers behind closed doors, and then inspects screening points, it sends a clear signal to frontline officers that the nation is watching, and to the travelling public that the state is awake.
We have learnt of the expansion of laboratory capacity from three to five laboratories capable of supporting Ebola response, and with a ready reference laboratory, it is a significant step up.
During COVID-19, we learnt painfully that without testing, we are blind. Isolation and treatment capacity at the infectious disease centre is also reportedly ready.
These are the visible layers of defence that matter more than thermal guns at the airport.
But if we are to avoid repeating the mistakes of past outbreak responses, we must go beyond airport optics and address the hard truths.
The Bundibugyo strain, which is at the centre of current concerns, has no specific licensed treatment or vaccine with the same level of efficacy as those for the Zaire strain.
That makes prevention, early detection and rapid contact tracing absolutely critical. It means our margin for error is extremely thin.
A single missed case at the border, a single delayed sample result, a single contact who disappears into a crowded market in Accra, Kumasi or Aflao, can trigger a chain that overwhelms the system.
Therefore, preparedness cannot be just the airport.
While the AIA is our most visible entry point, Ghana's epidemiological vulnerability lies equally along our land borders — Aflao, Elubo, Paga, Hamile, Gonokrom — and our seaports at Tema and Takoradi.
These are often porous, under-staffed, and lacking the Port Health infrastructure available at Kotoka.
If we screen rigorously at KIA but wave through buses at Aflao, we are merely locking the front door and leaving the back door wide open.
The ministry must show the same energy at our land borders as it has at the airport.
Furthermore, preparedness is about people, not just equipment.
Are our contact tracers re-trained?
Are our community health nurses equipped to recognise early symptoms that mimic malaria and typhoid? Do our district hospitals have isolation holding bays and clear referral protocols?
Is there a public communication strategy that informs without causing panic, and in languages that market women and drivers understand?
During COVID-19, we built impressive community surveillance systems.
Many have since gone dormant. Now is the time to reactivate them.
The minister's final directive deserves emphasis: no exceptions.
Diseases are no respecter of anybody.
So, at the VIP level and everywhere, anybody who arrives must go through the processes.
That cannot be overstated. In this country, enforcement of health protocols often collapses at the VIP lounge.
Dignitaries, politicians and business moguls often bypass hand sanitisation and screening.
The minister's insistence on polite but firm enforcement for all, regardless of status, must be backed by instructions to the security and protocol officers who often intimidate Port Health staff.
A virus does not carry a diplomatic passport.
Finally, coordination. We are aware there is ongoing coordination with continental bodies such as the Africa CDC. That is vital. Ebola does not respect ECOWAS protocols.
We need real-time intelligence sharing with Nigeria, Guinea, DR Congo and Uganda. We need to know what is happening on the next flight before it lands.
Ghana has been lucky before. In 2014, despite the devastation in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, we escaped.
That luck was partly due to preparedness and partly due to providence. We cannot gamble again.
We must be ready.
We should not be afraid.
The Daily Graphic agrees.
But readiness is a daily discipline, not a one-day tour.
Let us keep the thermal scanners on, the laboratories stocked, the border staff vigilant, and the public informed.
Let us prepare as if a case will arrive tomorrow, even as we pray it never does.
